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Abstract Projects tend to exceed planned timelines and budgets. One reason may
be that potential project risks are insufficiently reflected in anticipations of project
success. Furthermore, project managers’ overconfidence may lead them to assess
risk in a biased manner. The present study examines how risk assessment relates to
overall anticipated project success and how overconfidence on the part of project
managers influences such assessments. We assume that project managers’ risk
awareness serves as a mediator between overconfidence and risk assessment. To
observe the planning behavior of 204 project managers, we used a standardized,
case-based survey. The results show that overconfidence reduces risk awareness
among project managers, leading them to assess risks more optimistically and come
to more positive conclusions about anticipated project success. When judging
project success, project managers only consider the probability of a risk occurring;
they do not factor in the impact of said risks on project success should the risks
arise. Risks thus seem to be insufficiently reflected in anticipations of project suc-
cess which might be a reason for high failure rates of projects.
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1 Introduction
The Berlin-Brandenburg Airport was originally budgeted at nearly 2 billion euros
(Press Release Airport Berlin-Brandenburg 2004), but the project ran into deadline
troubles and the total costs will exceed twice the projected amount (Handelsblatt
2015). Unfortunately, this project is no isolated incident. When it comes to project
management, countless examples demonstrate the human tendency to set overly
optimistic plans (Buehler et al. 1994; Pich et al. 2002; Raz et al. 2002), both in the
public and private sector (Huff and Prybutok 2008; Shepherd and Cardon 2009;
Whittaker 1999). However, due to the complexity inherent to many projects, it often
remains difficult to determine the reasons for even obvious cases of overly
optimistic project planning.
We focus on project managers’ risk assessment to evaluate potential reasons for
poor project performance. Risks are inherent in every project (Huff and Prybutok
2008) and defined as uncertain events that exert positive or negative effects on a
project’s objectives (Bryde and Volm 2009; PMI 2008), making risks a likely reason
for deviations from the project management plan. Various studies have found that
project risk management measures, including assessing the impacts of risks and the
probability of them occurring, are key contributors to project success (Oehmen et al.
2014; Raz et al. 2002; Salomo et al. 2007; Teller et al. 2014). What has not been
investigated, however, is how risk assessment influences project managers’
anticipated project success. Many projects may fail to achieve project objectives
as a result of risks being insufficiently considered by project managers, thus leading
them to make overly positive projections for project success. To the best of our
knowledge, no management studies have focused on how project managers’ risk
assessment may not adequately be considered in their anticipated project success.
Risk assessment includes the evaluation of the impacts of risks and the probability
of them occurring. The present study investigates whether both impacts and
occurrence probabilities of risks are considered in project managers’ anticipations of
project success. These risk assessments may, in addition, be affected by
overconfident judgments, as people are often unaware of the limited accuracy of
their judgments and tend to express overly high levels of confidence in their ability
to make accurate estimates (Moore and Healy 2008). This bias is referred to as
overconfidence and has been found to lead to risky behavior in various business
settings such as entrepreneurial decision making (Hayward et al. 2006), investment
decisions (Nosic´ and Weber 2010), or new product development (Simon and
Houghton 2003). While the literature shows that overconfidence may promote risk
taking, it remains unclear what links overconfidence to risky behavior.
Prior to demonstrating risky behavior, people must first engage in a decision-
making process in which they assess potential risks and subsequently choose their
behavior (Glo¨ckner and Betsch 2008; Tversky and Kahneman 1992). Aiming to
clarify the cognitive process between risky behavior and overconfidence, we
evaluate how overconfidence influences the assessment of risks. Risk assessment is
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an antecedent of risky behavior and has been shown to predict such behavior
(Cooper and Faseruk 2011; Glo¨ckner and Betsch 2008). With risk assessment, we
evaluate a hitherto neglected link between overconfidence and risky behavior. In
reference to the availability of risks in memory (Tversky and Kahneman 1973), we
furthermore introduce risk awareness as a mediator between overconfidence and
risk assessment and define risk awareness as the generic attitude of people toward
the threat which risks pose. The present study investigates how overconfidence may
reduce risk awareness and lead to an overly optimistic risk assessment, thereby
clarifying how overconfidence may lead to risky behavior.
We base our research on a case study, which we conducted with 204 professional
project managers. Our case study simulated the planning process for a product
development project, including a work breakdown structure, milestone schedule,
quantitative risk analysis, and assessment of anticipated project success. We also
gathered data on participants’ overconfidence, risk awareness, and demographic
profiles. The evaluation of the study was conducted using SmartPLS (Ringle et al.
2005).
The results indicate that risk assessment is influenced by project managers’
overconfidence through the mediator of risk awareness. Additionally, risks seem to
be insufficiently reflected in project managers’ anticipated project success. Thus,
our study offers the following contributions: Firstly, the present study considers the
process through which overconfidence may lead to risky behavior, while earlier
research mostly links overconfidence directly to risky behavior (Li and Tang 2010;
Nosic´ and Weber 2010; Simon and Houghton 2003): Overconfidence leads to a
lower perceived threat of risks (i.e., lower risk awareness), which in turn influences
project managers’ risk assessment. Secondly, risks are insufficiently considered in
anticipated project success: Only the estimated likelihood of a risk occurring has an
influence on a project manager’s assessment of project success; the estimated
impacts of these risks are neglected. This may lead to overly positive anticipated
project success, as risks with a high impact on project outcomes are insufficiently
considered. Insufficient consideration of risks results in the project deviating from
anticipated outcomes, which may be a reason for the common high failure rates in
project management. Thirdly, from the perspective of decision theory, the lack of
influence that estimated risk impact has on anticipated project success is
unexpected, as decision theory suggests that people focus on outcomes, which are
directly affected by risk impacts, before considering probabilities (Brandsta¨tter et al.
2006; Brandsta¨tter and Gussmack 2013) or at least consider outcomes and
probabilities to a similar extent (Glo¨ckner and Betsch 2008; Tversky and Kahneman
1992). Our study therefore offers valuable insights into how risks are considered
when anticipating success.
The body of this article is structured as follows: First, we elaborate the research
background and discuss our research model as well as the associated hypotheses.
Second, we describe our study procedure and the measures that were used. Third,
we present the results of our study, followed by a discussion including conclusions
and implications of our findings.
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2 Research background and hypotheses
2.1 Risk assessment and anticipated project success
Failed projects are a major topic in academia (Shepherd et al. 2011) as well as in
project management magazines, blogs, and mass media (Huff and Prybutok 2008).
Most experienced project managers are likely to have first hand experience with
failed projects or missed targets, due to the occurrence of risks which impact project
outcomes (Jugdev and Mu¨ller 2005; Raz et al. 2002). Nevertheless, when starting
projects with the goal to, for instance, optimize internal processes or create
competitive advantage through innovative product development, risk taking is an
inevitable prerequisite for achieving company goals (Brockman et al. 2012), as there
is no such thing as a risk free project (Huff and Prybutok 2008). It is widely
acknowledged in project management literature that risks may have positive or
negative effects on a project’s objectives (Bryde and Volm 2009; Maguire and
Hardy 2013; PMI 2008) and therefore may not only be a threat to project success,
but also create opportunities (Teller et al. 2014). However, project risk management
processes still focus on potential negative effects (Bryde and Volm 2009; Raz et al.
2002), and risks in a project management context usually refer to uncertain events
with negative or undesirable consequences (Maguire and Hardy 2013; Oehmen et al.
2014). Thus, it can be concluded that project risk management aims to identify
uncertain events and their (predominantly negative) impact on the project for the
purpose of reducing the said impact (Pich et al. 2002). Theories which seek to
explain decision making under uncertainty are the priority heuristic (Brandsta¨tter
et al. 2006; Brandsta¨tter and Gussmack 2013) or expected utility models such as the
(cumulative) prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Tversky and Kahne-
man 1992). When determining the utility of implementing a project by using
expected utility models or assessing the choice to implement a specific project by
using the priority heuristic (Brandsta¨tter et al. 2006; Glo¨ckner and Betsch 2008), the
decision to implement said project will depend on the impact that risks will have on
the outcome of the project and on the probabilities of these risks occurring. The
assessment of risks therefore forms the input of the decision process which decision
makers follow when deciding on the implementation of a project.
Literature offers two heuristics as possible mechanisms underlying risk
assessment: availability heuristic and affect heuristic (Pachur et al. 2012).
Availability heuristic proposes that people assess the probability of an event by
the ease with which occurrences of similar events can be recalled (Schwarz et al.
1991; Tversky and Kahneman 1973). The availability of risks has been confirmed to
highly correlate with people’s judgments of risk occurrence probabilities (Hertwig
et al. 2005; Pachur et al. 2012). When risks occur, they can evoke strong emotions
(Pachur et al. 2012). The affect heuristic (Finucane et al. 2000; King and Slovic
2014; Slovic et al. 2007) focuses on this linkage between risks and emotions,
proposing that people use their affective, emotional response to a risk to judge its
impact and occurrence probability. Pachur et al. (2012) compare how well
availability heuristic and affect heuristic predict people’s judgments and find that
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overall availability of direct experience seems to be a better predictor than affective
information. However, their results furthermore indicate that people do not
exclusively rely on one heuristic, but combine both heuristics, either sequentially or
in a composite fashion (Pachur et al. 2012). Therefore, people’s risk assessment is
likely influenced by both availability of risks and the affective, emotional response
to risks.
Risk assessment in project management is carried out by quantitative risk
analysis, which is a central part of risk management (Raz et al. 2002; Teller et al.
2014). Quantitative risk analysis is defined as ‘‘the process of numerically analyzing
the effect of identified risks on overall project objectives’’ (PMI 2008, 294). It
involves the assessment of the estimated probability of a risk occurring and the
estimated impact that the risk’s occurrence would have on project objectives. Raz
et al. (2002) assess the usage of five risk management practices, including risk
assessment in terms of estimated risk occurrence probability and estimated risk
impact, and find that the usage of these risk management practices contributes to
meeting budget goals in projects characterized by high uncertainty. Teller et al.
(2014) and Salomo et al. (2007) find that the application of formal project risk
management leads to higher project portfolio success. Likewise, Oehmen et al.
(2014) find that risk management practices, including the quantification of expected
impacts of risks on main project objectives, or the systematic monitoring and
reviewing of risks, positively influence decision-making quality, the stable
execution of the project plan, and a proactive project organization. Furthermore,
their findings indicate that applying risk management practices indirectly influence
both project success and product success (in the context of new product
development) mediated through the aforementioned constructs of decision-making
quality, stable project plan execution, and a proactive project organization.
Despite the considerable amount of research conducted on project success, no
consensus has yet been reached regarding the definition of project success and
project failure (Ika 2009). Project success is a multi-dimensional construct of
compliance with overall project objectives (Jugdev and Mu¨ller 2005), with different
dimensions having been suggested as essentials (Ika 2009). The classic solution
upon which most researchers can agree is to apply the ‘‘triangle of virtue’’ as
success criteria: time, costs and quality (Ika 2009; Raz et al. 2002). We define
project success as the compliance of the project’s outcome with what is specified in
the project plan regarding time, costs, and quality. In the present study, the
anticipated project success is measured by assessing the project managers’
expectations of future project success. We consider anticipated project success to
be a relevant measure in our model, as decision makers and project managers are
likely to base their decision to begin or to continue a project on how successful they
anticipate the project to be. After introducing the research background of risk
assessment in project management and the concept of project success, we now move
to the concept of overconfidence seeking to explain why project managers’ risk
assessment may be overly positive.
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2.2 Overconfidence
A cognitive bias which has often been linked to risky behavior is overconfidence
(Hayward et al. 2006; Li and Tang 2010; Nosic´ and Weber 2010): People tend to be
too certain about the accuracy of their own estimates, a general tendency that has
been well documented in academic literature (Pulford and Colman 1997; Teigen and
Jørgensen 2005; Tsai et al. 2008). In the present study, we adopted a narrower
definition of overconfidence as an overestimation of one’s own ability to make
accurate estimates (Moore and Healy 2008, also referred to as ‘‘overprecision’’).
Overconfidence has been discussed as the cause of entrepreneurs founding new
companies even when the prospects of success are dim (Hayward et al. 2006).
Busenitz and Barney (1997) argue that without biases such as overconfidence, many
entrepreneurial decisions would never be made and show that entrepreneurs are
significantly more overconfident than managers in large organization.
Despite these potentially favorable effects of overconfidence in entrepreneurship,
overconfidence has been shown to lead to hazardous risk taking, lowering the
performance of investment portfolios (Barber and Odean 2001), and leading people
to invest in riskier portfolios (Nosic´ and Weber 2010). Overconfidence also relates
positively to the degree of risk linked to a product introduction in the way that
decision makers who decide on riskier new product introductions exhibit higher
degrees of overconfidence (Simon and Houghton 2003). Similarly, Li and Tang
(2010) find that risk taking of a company relates positively to the CEO’s
overconfidence, leading CEOs to overpay for target companies and to undertake
value-destroying mergers (Malmendier and Tate 2008). Not even specialists and
experts are immune to overconfidence: McKenzie et al. (2008) find similar levels of
overconfidence among groups of IT experts and students. Similarly, Speirs-Bridge
et al. (2010) identify overconfidence among health-care specialists and environ-
mental experts, and Jørgensen (2004) notes overconfidence expressed by IT
professionals.
After we now introduced the research background of our study, we will, based on
already identified research gaps and research questions, develop our hypotheses in
the following section.
2.3 Hypothesis development
People use heuristics (‘‘rules of thumb’’; Hutchinson and Gigerenzer 2005) to assess
situations or make decisions when it is not possible or efficient to consider all
potentially available information. As most of the time not all potentially available
information is considered, heuristics are applied in most decisions to simplify
decision making (Busenitz and Barney 1997). Heuristics are useful when predicting
future developments (Gigerenzer and Brighton 2009). Where simple and valid
feedback exists and people have the opportunity to learn from this feedback,
judgments based on heuristics will on average be more accurate than analytical
judgments (Bingham and Eisenhardt 2011). When, however, the environment of
decision making is characterized by high complexity and dynamic feedback—as is
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the case in project management (Pich et al. 2002)—intuitive judgments that are
based on heuristics may lead to systematic biases (Kahneman and Tversky 1996).
According to the priority heuristic (Brandsta¨tter et al. 2006), people base their
decision first on potential outcomes of the decision and second on respective
probabilities of these outcomes (Brandsta¨tter and Gussmack 2013). While assessing
both the impacts of risks and the probability of them occurring contributes to project
success (Oehmen et al. 2014; Raz et al. 2002; Salomo et al. 2007; Teller et al. 2014),
it has not been investigated how risk assessment is considered in anticipations of
project success. We propose that many projects may fail to achieve project
objectives as a result of risks being insufficiently considered by project managers,
thus leading them to make overly positive projections for project success.
When they occur, risks have an impact on project costs and project completion
time (Marmier et al. 2013); so, anticipated project success should depend on
estimated risk impacts, as well as on estimated occurrence probabilities. The risks
we consider in this study all have negative or undesirable consequences for the focal
project, in line with standard project management practice (Maguire and Hardy
2013; Oehmen et al. 2014). The outcomes that result from the decision to carry out
the project are always influenced by occurring risks (Raz et al. 2002), such that
increasing risk impacts and risk occurrence probabilities mitigate the value of the
decision to conduct the project (Dey 2012). If project success is compliance with a
specific outcome, which has specific value to the company, then anticipated project
success should decrease with greater risk impacts and risk occurrence probabilities.
Thus, we hypothesize:
H1a Project managers who consider project-related risks more likely anticipate
lower project success.
H1b Project managers who expect project-related risks to have a stronger impact
on project goals anticipate lower project success.
Anticipation of success is prone to biases linked to the desirability of the outcome
(Seybert and Bloomfield 2009; Vosgerau 2010; Windschitl et al. 2010) or to
perceived but non-existent control over the outcome (Goodman and Irwin 2006;
Langer and Roth 1975). At the same time, information supporting desirable
outcomes is perceived to be more credible than information supporting undesirable
outcomes (Barber et al. 2009; Gordon et al. 2005). In this sense, anticipated project
success may be biased by people’s insufficient consideration of the impact or
occurrence probability of risk. An insufficient consideration of risk will lead to
deviations between anticipated and actual project success, which results in higher
project failure rates. Expected utility models such as prospect theory (Kahneman
and Tversky 1979; Tversky and Kahneman 1992) or more simple expectancy value
models such as the expected monetary value analysis, which is commonly applied in
project management (Dey 2012; PMI 2008), would predict that both risk occurrence
probabilities and risk impacts have a similar influence on the decision to carry out a
project. However, Brandsta¨tter et al. (2006) suggest in their priority heuristic that
people do not base their decisions on internal calculations of occurrence probability
and related outcomes, but focus primarily on outcomes before considering
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probabilities (Brandsta¨tter et al. 2006; Brandsta¨tter and Gussmack 2013; Glo¨ckner
and Betsch 2008). Applying this prediction to a project management context, we
anticipate that the impact of risk impact on project success (H1b) is the primary path
of influence, while risk occurrence probability (H1a) influences anticipated project
success less powerfully. Thus we propose H2:
H2 The influence of the estimated risk impact on anticipated project success is
stronger than the influence of the estimated risk occurrence probability on
anticipated project success.
While earlier research mostly links overconfidence directly to risky behavior (Li
and Tang 2010; Nosic´ and Weber 2010; Simon and Houghton 2003), decision
theory suggests that people must first engage in a decision-making process in which
they assess potential risks and subsequently choose their behavior (Glo¨ckner and
Betsch 2008; Tversky and Kahneman 1992). In the following, we investigate how
overconfidence may reduce risk awareness and lead to an overly optimistic risk
assessment. Thereby we aim to clarify how overconfidence may lead to risky
behavior.
In general, people tend to imagine positive outcomes for their plans,
overwhelmingly ignoring possible negative scenarios in favor of wishful thinking
(Newby-Clark et al. 2000). In a project planning context, this tendency implies that
project managers mostly work under the assumption that all their projects will
succeed (Raz et al. 2002), with the apparent belief that project risks will not occur or
will have little impact on the project’s success. An overconfident project manager is
overly certain that his or her predictions are correct (Moore and Healy 2008) and
thus will consider it unlikely that reality will deviate from her or his plans.
Overconfident decision makers underestimate the variance of the result they are
trying to predict (Moore and Healy 2008). Therefore, an overconfident individual
will likely only generate a single or a very limited number of scenarios when
assessing uncertain future developments and will typically focus on how objectives
will be accomplished successfully (Newby-Clark et al. 2000). This implies that
scenarios which contain the occurrence of risks will not be readily available in
project managers’ minds. Van Zant and Moore (2013) refer to such low availability
when they state that overconfidence can blind people to the size of the risks they are
taking. According to the availability heuristic (Schwarz et al. 1991; Tversky and
Kahneman 1973), a low availability of incidents in which risks occurred will lead to
lower estimated risk occurrence probabilities (Sjo¨berg and Engelberg 2010) and
may cause risks to be perceived as less threatening (Pachur et al. 2012). We propose
that overconfidence is linked to low availability of incidents in which risks occur,
leading to lower risk awareness. We hypothesize that overconfidence will—
mediated through risk awareness—lead to lower estimated risk occurrence
probabilities and estimated risk impacts:
H3a Higher overconfidence leads to lower estimated risk occurrence probability
through the mediation of risk awareness.
H3b Higher overconfidence leads to lower estimated risk impact through the
mediation of risk awareness.
246 Business Research (2015) 8:239–263
123
Apart from the hypothesized impact of overconfidence on risk assessment
through the mediator of risk awareness, we furthermore assume that overconfidence
might be linked directly to an overly positive assessment of risk occurrence
probabilities and risk impacts. Overconfidence has been shown to lead to hazardous
risk taking by overtrading stocks, decreasing portfolio performance compared to
market performance (Barber and Odean 2001) and leading people to take additional
risks (Van Zant and Moore 2013). Similarly, overconfidence leads CEOs to overpay
for target companies and to undertake value-destroying mergers (Malmendier and
Tate 2008). CEO’s overconfidence furthermore leads to increased risk taking by the
firm (Li and Tang 2010). Because decision theory suggests that people assess risks
before they engage in risky behavior (Glo¨ckner and Betsch 2008), we predict that
higher overconfidence leads to more positive risk assessments:
H4a Project managers with greater overconfidence consider project-related risks
less likely.
H4b Project managers with greater overconfidence expect project-related risks to
have less impact.
Our research model is in Fig. 1.
3 Method
3.1 Sample characteristics
A total of 204 project managers from different companies and industries took part in
this study. Most of the participants (89 %) had at least 3 years’ experience in project
management; nearly half (47 %) had more than ten. The most common age range
was 36–45 years (43.1 %). Furthermore, 55.4 % of participants had certification in
project management, and a further 7.4 % planned to obtain one. 78.0 % had a
Fig. 1 Research model
Business Research (2015) 8:239–263 247
123
university degree; 8.8 % had attained a doctoral degree. Finally, 18.1 % of
participants were women and 81.9 % were men.
3.2 Procedure
Participants received a survey to be completed online. A case study simulated the
planning process of a product development project, including a work breakdown
structure, a milestone schedule, a quantitative risk analysis, and an assessment of
anticipated project success in terms of time, costs, and quality. We subsequently
measured participants’ overconfidence and risk awareness along with their
demographic data. The online survey took an average (mean) of 18 min per
participant to complete.
During the development of the case study, we consulted experienced project
managers to discuss potential difficulties in understanding and to ensure that the
case study mirrored project management practice. At the end of the survey,
participants were asked to leave anonymous remarks in a textbox. These remarks
were generally quite positive and did not indicate any difficulties in understanding
the survey, nor did the participants criticize the planning instruments used in the
study.
3.3 Case study and work breakdown structure
The case study scenario described a fictional company that produces wooden toys
for children and wants to develop a new toy. For the survey, the participant assumed
the role of a project manager who would oversee product development. Participants
received a description of the requirements for the new product, as well as pictures of
similar products already in the company’s product portfolio. We also provided them
with information about the company’s production processes, other parties involved
in the project, and a monetary budget.
After reviewing the project’s background information, participants familiarized
themselves with the tasks that needed to be accomplished to conduct the project.
The project managers dragged and dropped six predefined work packages
(Appendix Fig. 3) into a work breakdown structure, divided into four sections.
The work breakdown structure was not a measurement instrument, but was rather
intended to help participants become familiar with the project and associated tasks.
No deadline or budget planning was involved in this step.
In the following step, after participants familiarized themselves with the project
structure, they created a milestone schedule to plan the project completion time.
After sorting all tasks (known from the work breakdown structure) into the four
phases of the project milestone schedule, project managers estimated how many
weeks each phase of the project would take. The project was considered complete if
all phases in the milestone schedule had been completed. The cumulative estimated
duration of all phases, i.e., the estimated completion time of the project, served as
preparation for the measure of anticipated project success.
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3.4 Assessments and measures
3.4.1 Anticipated project success
The assessment of anticipated project success includes individual ratings of time,
costs, and quality. For example, we asked about the likelihood of a project ‘‘not
going over the amount allotted in its budget’’. Project managers made their
assessments on a seven-point Likert scale (1 = highly unlikely; 7 = highly likely).
The budget and given time frame for the project were indicated, as conformance
with project goals can only be measured relative to a specification (Karmarkar and
Pitbladdo 1997).
Defining project success in terms of time, costs, and quality is not only easily
applicable and understandable, but also widespread in project management practice
(Jugdev and Mu¨ller 2005). Measurement approaches that take a broader scope on
critical success metrics may be more sophisticated from a theoretical point of view,
but are rarely confirmed by credible empirical research (Nicolai and Kieser 2002).
Accordingly, we chose to limit ourselves to the well-established fundamentals.
Anticipated project success contains several dimensions, making it a formative
measure. Multicollinearity was not present, as the maximum VIF of all items was
3.1.
3.4.2 Risk assessment: risk occurrence probability and risk impact
Risk assessment includes both the assessment of the likelihood that a risk will occur
and the assessment of the risk’s impact on the project should the said risk actually
occur (Raz et al. 2002; Teller et al. 2014). Risk assessment was conducted in the
context of the case study using predefined risks. For example, participants estimated
the occurrence probability and risk impact on the project for the following risk:
‘‘The design of the product has to be changed in order to ensure technical
feasibility’’. Each risk was accompanied by background information that explained
the situation and previous similar experiences, usually mentioning relevant
quantifiable facts (see Appendix Fig. 4). For the aforementioned risk, the following
background information was provided: ‘‘Over the past several years, around 40 %
of all newly developed products had to be changed in order to fit technical
requirements. For instance, designs are changed when the original design would
lead to an overly complicated production process’’. Participants assessed risk
occurrence probability and estimated risk impact using a five-point Likert scale
(1 = very low; 5 = very high), which is in line with established practices in project
risk management (Raz et al. 2002).
Both estimated risk occurrence probability and estimated risk impact are
formative measures, as the latent constructs are described by their indicators, and
not vice versa (Diamantopoulos and Winklhofer 2001). It thus follows that an
increase in the expected risk occurrence probability for one risk does not lead to an
increased value for all risks. A strong correlation between the indicators of
formative latent variables is not necessary; instead, we checked for
Business Research (2015) 8:239–263 249
123
multicollinearity. The variance inflation factor (VIF) for each item was equal to or
less than 1.29, well under the recommended limit of 10 (Diamantopoulos and
Winklhofer 2001).
3.4.3 Overconfidence
Overconfidence is commonly measured by asking participants to answer knowl-
edge-based questions in a multiple choice format and to indicate their level of
confidence in each answer. Overconfidence is present if the expectation of accuracy
exceeds actual accuracy (Pulford and Colman 1997). An alternative method, which
we applied for this study, requires participants to make numerical interval estimates
at a given level of accuracy (McKenzie et al. 2008; Soll and Klayman 2004; Teigen
and Jørgensen 2005). A confidence level of 80 %, for instance, thus implies that
80 % of interval estimates should include the actual value. People commonly
exhibit a high level of overconfidence when completing this exercise, such that less
than 50 % of their interval estimates contain the actual value (Moore and Healy
2008).
Interval estimates (i.e., best case and worst case estimates) at a certain level of
confidence are common practice in project management (PMI 2008; Teigen and
Jørgensen 2005), for instance when estimating activity durations. We therefore
chose to use interval estimates to measure overconfidence, as we see this method as
more closely reflecting project management practice. Project managers might not
expect the generally more common measure of overconfidence based on multiple
choice questions (Moore and Healy 2008) to occur in project management context.
In this study, we use numerical interval estimates to measure overconfidence, but we
avoided posing knowledge-based questions with numerical answers: We suspected
that project managers, when asked to give interval estimates about matters that fall
outside their area of competence (e.g., ‘‘How long is the Nile River?’’; Moore and
Healy 2008), may be reluctant to answer such requests (Kahneman and Klein 2009).
We therefore decided to ask about the average completion time for a specified
activity, namely, furniture assembly. Project managers often must predict how long
it will take others—namely, their coworkers, subordinates, or external service
providers—to complete tasks. They typically do not have to assess their own work
in this manner, but rather coordinate and plan tasks to be completed by other
employees. Participants estimated how long it would take, on average, to construct
several pieces of IKEA furniture. Participants were asked to choose an interval
range between two points—a best case and a worst case—while the actual assembly
times for each piece of furniture should be within this range in 80 % of the cases.
Participants based their estimates on pictorial assembly instructions that we
provided to them for five pieces of furniture: a shelf, a TV stand, a stool, a stepstool,
and a laundry hamper. To determine actual assembly times, we recorded the time
needed for eight people (who did not participate in this study) to put together the
furniture; each person assembled all five pieces independently.1 IKEA products
1 This study was not conducted in conjunction with IKEA; no support was provided by the company.
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were chosen because of their widespread familiarity among our sample: 95.6 % of
the project managers had personal experience assembling IKEA products.
Overconfidence is usually calculated by subtracting the percentage of accurate
answers from the given level of confidence. When, for instance, the given
confidence level is 80 %, and three out of five (60 %) of a participant’s interval
estimates include the actual furniture assembly time, the participant’s overconfi-
dence score is OC = 0.8–0.6 = 0.2. Anderson et al. (2012) note that scores
calculated in this way may contain distortions by estimates that are fundamentally
too low or too high. Following their suggestion, we therefore calculate a corrected
measure of overconfidence by regressing the estimated task-completion time on the
traditional calculation of overconfidence. The corrected measure of overconfidence
consists of the residual scores. This overconfidence score cannot be explained by the
estimated task-completion time that the participants listed for any piece of furniture,
so this procedure eliminates the distorting effect. Overconfidence is decidedly not
related to estimates that are too long or too short, but rather to unwarranted
confidence in one’s own abilities to make accurate estimates.
As expected, our exploratory factor analysis revealed only one factor. However,
the results of the confirmatory factor analysis were not quite satisfying (v2 = 19.90,
df = 5, v2/df = 3.98, GFI = 0.961, AGFI = 0.883, RMSEA = 0.121), so we
excluded the laundry hamper assembly time item from our analysis, because its
factor loading was only 0.529. After removing it, the confirmatory factor analysis
showed mostly satisfying results (v2 = 5.69, df = 2, v2/df = 2.84, GFI = 0.987,
AGFI = 0.934, RMSEA = 0.095). Cronbach’s alpha was 0.70 (AVE = 0.52,
q = 0.81).
3.4.4 Risk awareness
We use a general measure, unrelated to the case study, to assess risk awareness.
Specifically, we asked project managers about the extent to which risks pose a threat
to project success in project management practice.
This measure should be less sensitive to social desirability biases (Turnley and
Bolino 2001) than common measures that focus on risk propensity (Sitkin and Pablo
1992; Sitkin and Weingart 1995; White et al. 2006), as project managers do not rate
their own risk preference or risk-taking behavior, but instead describe their practical
experience with project management. An alternative measure would have been to
ask participants whether they consider their estimates to be more optimistic or
pessimistic, but again we would face social desirability and self-perception biases:
No experienced project manager could, for example, be expected to admit that she
or he is repeatedly underestimating task-completion times or risk occurrence
probabilities. The analyses relied on seven-point Likert scales (1 = strongly agree;
7 = strongly disagree).
The Cronbach’s alpha for the six items was 0.75, which indicated good
reliability. We conducted a confirmatory factor analysis for the one factor construct
that did not indicate sufficiently good fit (v22 = 83.18, df = 9, v22/df = 9.24,
GFI = 0.877, AGFI = 0.714, RMSEA = 0.202). The exploratory factor analysis
indicated the existence of two factors with three items each (44 and 19 %
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explanation of total variance). We thus modeled risk awareness in a two-
dimensional structure as suggested by the exploratory factor analysis. We could not
conduct a confirmatory factor analysis for the two-factor construct, as it was
underidentified (Giere et al. 2006). We could, however, calculate the model fit for
the first part of the model, which contains only the reflective constructs of
overconfidence and risk awareness. The results indicate good fit (v2 = 36.10,
df = 32, v2/df = 1.13, GFI = 0.966, AGFI = 0.941, RMSEA = 0.025) and con-
firm risk awareness as a second-order construct with two factors. We applied this
two-dimensional structure to our research model and modeled risk awareness as a
second-order construct.
The first dimension appears to reflect a micro-view of risk awareness
(Cronbach’s a = 0.65). Project managers indicate if their assessment of individual
risks causes problems in project management practice (for example ‘‘Unexpected
problems often occur during project implementation’’). The second dimension
(Cronbach’s a = 0.72) pertains to more general statements about the threat that
risks pose to project success (for example ‘‘Projects usually exceed deadlines, as
future developments are mostly unforeseeable’’). Item elimination did not increase
Cronbach’s a; therefore no items were eliminated. The average variances extracted
(AVEfactor1 = 0.60, AVEfactor2 = 0.65) and factor reliabilities (qfactor1 = 0.81,
qfactor2 = 0.85) exceeded the values recommended by Homburg and Baumgartner
(1998).
3.5 Modeling and avoidance of common method variance
We calculated the model in Fig. 1 using SmartPLS (Ringle et al. 2005). We decided
to use partial least squares (PLS) for this study, because it allows us to include
formative variables in addition to reflective ones (Fassott and Eggert 2005). Using a
case study and a specific measurement of overconfidence in our research allowed us
to reduce the risk of common method variance (Podsakoff et al. 2003) by using
different measurement designs for different constructs. When project managers
estimated the time it would take to assemble IKEA furniture, they were not familiar
with the underlying concept of overconfidence and thus did not know how the
measure would be calculated. It therefore seems unlikely that project managers
could match their responses to the dependent constructs or find ways to provide
what they perceived to be socially desirable answers. In risk assessment, we used a
substantially different design to evaluate risks compared to the dependent variable
of anticipated project success; so again, participants were unlikely to be able to
match their answers or anticipate a desired relationship between these two concepts.
To further avoid a common method variance, we followed the suggestions of
Podsakoff et al. (2003): we made participation voluntary, did not give clues about
the relationships actually being examined, and guaranteed confidentiality and
anonymous evaluation of the results to reduce social desirability in participants’
answers.
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4 Results
We hypothesize in H1 that the estimated risk occurrence probability and the
estimated risk impact would influence anticipated project success. Estimated risk
occurrence probability had, in line with H1a, a significant impact on anticipated
project success (c = -0.362, p\ 0.001). H1b, however, was rejected, as estimated
risk impact did not have a significant impact on anticipated project success
(c = 0.026, p = 0.880). The results are in Fig. 2; the correlations of the constructs
are in Table 1.
InHypothesis H2,we propose that estimated risk impact should have a significantly
stronger influence on anticipated project success than estimated risk occurrence
probability. Contrary to what was predicted, only the influence of estimated risk
occurrence probability was found to be significant (c = -0.362, p\ 0.001), while
estimated risk impact did not have significant influence (c = 0.026, p = 0.880).
Furthermore, the path coefficient of estimated risk impact to anticipated project
success is slightly positive, which therefore does not indicate that higher estimated risk
impact would reduce anticipated project success. Using linear regression analysis, we
test if estimated risk impact accounts for a significantR2 of anticipated project success,
which was not the case (R2 = 0.006, F(1202) = 1.30, p = 0.256). When adding
estimated risk occurrence probability to the regression model, R2 increased
significantly (R2change = 0.107, F(1201) = 24.17, p\ 0.001). Accordingly, H2 has
to be rejected, as the results show that estimated risk impact has no significant effect on
anticipated project success, while the effect of estimated risk occurrence probability
on anticipated project success is significant.
To test for the mediation of risk awareness as proposed in H3, we first consider the
path from overconfidence to the potential mediator of risk awareness: overconfidence
led to significantly decreased levels of risk awareness (c = -0.178, p = 0.016).
Fig. 2 Results
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Second, risk awareness significantly influenced both estimated risk occurrence
probability (c = 0.236, p = 0.005) and estimated risk impact (c = 0.247,
p = 0.032). Excluding the risk awareness construct to assess the total effect of
overconfidence on risk assessment clarified the relationship between overconfidence
and both estimated risk occurrence probability (before: c = -0.115, p = 0.35; after:
c = -0.143, p = 0.30) and estimated risk impact (before: c = -0.024, p = 0.87;
after: c = -0.143, p = 0.51). This finding indicates a mediation of risk awareness, as
furthermore all path coefficients from and to the mediator are significantly different
from zero (Eggert et al. 2005). To test the mediating effect, Zhao et al. (2010) suggest
the bootstrapping method developed by Preacher et al. (2007). In applying this
method, we found a significant indirect effect of overconfidence on risk occurrence
probability through risk awareness (p = 0.039, one-tailed), but the effect of
overconfidence on estimated risk impact was only significant to a probability of error
of p\ 0.1 (p = 0.079, one-tailed). A Sobel z-test (Baron and Kenny 1986) resulted in
similar values: a significant indirect effect of overconfidence on risk occurrence
probability (p = 0.032, one-tailed), but only a nearly significant effect of overcon-
fidence on risk impact (p = 0.063, one-tailed).We did not uncover a significant, direct
impact of overconfidence on estimated risk occurrence probability (c = -0.115,
p = 0.345);we therefore cannot confirmH4a. Similarly,wewere not able to uncover a
significant, direct impact of overconfidence on estimated risk impact (c = -0.024,
p = 0.867), we thus cannot confirm H4b.
Wegathereddemographic data about the participants (gender, age, education, project
management experience, and certification) to control for the potential effects of these
variables. Only age exerted an effect: a significant negative impact on estimated risk
occurrence probability (c = -0.306, p\ 0.001, R2 = 0.093). It did not, however,
influence estimated risk impact.We performed anANOVA to test for a gender effect on
overconfidence, but did not find any significant effect [F(1, 202) = 0.083, p = 0.773].
Table 1 Correlation matrix



















Overconfidence 0.72;0.33 0.03 -0.06 1




3.08; 0.61 -0.32** 0.10 -0.17* 0.23** 1
** p\ 0.001
* p\ 0.05
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Moreover, overconfidence did not depend on age (rs = 0.043, p = 0.545) or project
management experience (rs = 0.049, p = 0.483), while higher educationmight reduce
overconfidence (rs = -0.106, p = 0.132).
Just as in other professions, project managers as a group demonstrate a significant
level of overconfidence: Their estimates did not achieve the intended confidence level of
80 % certainty. Instead, they contained the empirically determined furniture assembly
times in only 26.5 % of the cases. This value demonstrates the severity with which
project managers overestimate their accuracy in making project-related estimates.
5 Discussion and conclusions
5.1 Discussion of findings and implications
A high percentage of projects fail to comply with project objectives (Huff and
Prybutok 2008; Shepherd and Cardon 2009; Whittaker 1999). Such deviations from
the project management plan are predominantly caused by risks, i.e., uncertain
events or conditions that, if they occur, have a positive or negative effect on a
project’s objectives (Bryde and Volm 2009; PMI 2008). Thus, we concluded that
occurrence probability of risks and their potential impact on project objectives may
be insufficiently reflected in anticipated project success, as otherwise, such
deviations would not occur as frequently.
This study investigated the influence of project managers’ risk assessment on
anticipated project success and found—contrary to what we proposed in H2—that
project managers only consider risk occurrence probabilities, but neglect potential
risk impacts on project objectives. According to the priority heuristic (Brandsta¨tter
et al. 2006; Brandsta¨tter and Gussmack 2013; Glo¨ckner and Betsch 2008), a focus
on outcomes rather than on occurrence probabilities would have been expected.
Furthermore, according to expected utility models such as the prospect theory
(Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Tversky and Kahneman 1992), individuals would
calculate the utility of a risky decision based on both potential outcomes and the
respective probabilities of such outcomes. Thus, our results support neither prospect
theory nor the priority heuristic in the given research context; instead, our results
indicate that managers consider the likelihood of risks arising when evaluating
potential project success while neglecting risk impacts. Future research may help to
clarify under which circumstances project managers mainly consider risk occur-
rence probabilities when anticipating project success. A replication of this finding
and the introduction of additional control variables (beyond demographic data) may
be required to detect opportunities to refine decision theory. Project management
needs to address risk impact explicitly in the decision-making processes. It is
therefore necessary to include both risk impact and risk occurrence probability in
the risk analysis, as suggested by PMI (2008). However, even with both elements
included, project managers are likely only to consider risk occurrence probability
when assessing how successful a project will be. Their biased assessment of
anticipated project success could be mitigated by an expected monetary value
analysis (PMI 2008), which entails both risk impacts and probabilities; although
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with this method, people may just assume that negative scenarios linked to high-
impact risks are less likely to occur than they actually are (Newby-Clark et al.
2000). The threat posed by these biased assessments of project success is not easy to
address in project management practice; risk impact is formally assessed in most
projects, and project managers may assume that risk impact has been appropriately
considered during the project-related decision process. But in reality, risk impact
may never have actually impacted their predictions of project success, in that it had
no actual influence on the decision-making process.
The average project manager has a strong tendency toward overconfident
judgments. This means that planning deviations are likely, because overconfidence
leads project managers to assume that deviations from their planning figures are less
likely than they actually are. When making two-point estimates at a given level of
confidence, this level is rarely achieved; for our study, the target confidence level
was 80 % certainty, but our empirically determined furniture assembly times were
only included in 26.5 % of the estimations. To reduce threats to project objectives,
effective risk management needs to be established to identify risks and plan
responses in advance. If this is not possible, risk management methods should be
used to reduce the impact of unexpected risks by developing solutions to get the
project back on track (PMI 2008).
Project managers with higher levels of overconfidence also demonstrate lower
levels of risk awareness, so they are likely to expend less effort to identify risks,
conduct quantitative or qualitative risk analyses, and design appropriate solutions
should a risk occur (Bryde and Volm 2009; Huff and Prybutok 2008). An
overconfident project manager expects a project to be implemented successfully
without deviating from what is planned. This low risk awareness may result in a
reduction in the perceived need to undertake sophisticated project risk management,
which further increases the threat of risks to project success. Risk awareness acts as
a mediator between overconfidence and risk assessment. Older project managers
assessed project risk occurrence probability as significantly less high, such that they
planned more optimistically than their younger colleagues, independently of their
amount of project management experience.
5.2 Limitations and further research
Estimated risk impact and estimated risk occurrence probability account only for a
limited proportion of the variance in anticipated project success (12.8 %). It would be
desirable to identify additional determinants that might explain when or why project
managers expect a project to be carried out successfully. For example, perhaps
comparative optimism, or the ‘‘better than average’’ effect, may increase managers’
expectations of success for their own projects (Hoorens et al. 2008; Krizan and
Windschitl 2007). Overconfidence influences project managers’ risk assessments
through their risk awareness; therefore, it may be helpful to identify additional
determinants of risk awareness and risk assessment to understandwhenmanagers tend
to underestimate risk occurrence probabilities and risk impacts. As risks may have
positive or negative effects on project’s objectives (Bryde and Volm 2009; Maguire
and Hardy 2013; PMI 2008), it may also be beneficial for future research not only to
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include risks with predominantly negative or undesirable consequences, but also to
consider risks which may create opportunities for the company.
Our results identify risk awareness as a mediator between overconfidence and
risk assessment. The availability heuristic (Schwarz et al. 1991; Tversky and
Kahneman 1973) might explain why overconfident project managers perceive risks
as less threatening: Overconfidence might reduce the availability of risks in project
managers’ memories, and this lower availability of risks decreases the perceived
threat of those risks (Pachur et al. 2012). However, in the present study, we did not
assess the availability of risks, but only risk awareness as the generic attitude of
people toward the threats to project success posed by project risks. Assessing the
availability of risks together with overconfidence could advance the understanding
of overconfidence by clarifying whether overconfidence indeed reduces the
availability of risks in memory. When the availability of risks in project managers’
memories is low, they will find it harder to recall occasions in which risks occurred.
This would reduce the estimated risk occurrence probabilities, as availability
heuristic suggests that people base their likelihood estimates on the availability of
events in memory (Schwarz et al. 1991; Tversky and Kahneman 1973). We see a
research opportunity in evaluating the statement of Van Zant and Moore (2013) in
detail, claiming that overconfidence can blind people to the size of the risks they are
taking. Future research may investigate whether overconfidence reduces the
availability of risks, therefore ‘blinding’ people to the threat posed by said risks.
A limitation of our study stems from its setting. Although we used a case study and
measures related to project management, it is not possible to replicate the full
complexity and scope of a real project in a laboratory setting. For example, interactions
among different individuals involved in the project likely exert effects that we did not
measure. People involved in the project may have different risk perceptions due to
their organizational roles. For instance, an assigned ‘‘risk response owner’’ who has
‘‘responsibility for each agreed-to and funded risk response’’ (PMI 2008, 301) might
perceive a particular risk in their area of responsibility as more threatening to project
objectives than other risks. A project member concerned with quality management
will focus on different risks than a team member whose focus is project communi-
cations or human resources. Similarly, a project manager likely perceives risks and
project success differently than other internal or external stakeholders, but will still be
influenced by these stakeholders through the communication they undertake to form
an agreement on project objectives and to promote an accurate understanding of
project benefits and risks.
Finally, we used a cross-sectional data set and thus have no information about
developments of anticipated project success or overconfidence over time, from
project initialization to subsequent phases of implementation and completion. The
project managers who participated in our study also have different professional
backgrounds, representing various industries and companies. Perhaps project
managers in IT companies behave differently from project managers in the building
sector, who may behave differently from project managers focused on new product
development or machinery development, for example. However, we found no
indication that project managers from different industries exhibited different
planning behavior in our study.
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5.3 Conclusion
Estimates of risk impact—unlike risk occurrence probability—appear insufficiently
considered when project managers form expectations about project success.
Therefore, and especially for high-impact risks, risk management efforts should
focus on planning risk responses to reduce their potential impact, should such risks
occur. The finding that project managers do not consider estimated risk impact—the
consequences of which are linked directly to project outcomes—in anticipated project
success is different fromwhat decision theorywould predict. Future researchmay help
to clarifywhy only risk occurrence probability is consideredwhen anticipating project
success. This finding—that project risks are inadequately considered in anticipated
project success—is of crucial importance for project management, as it offers an
explanation as to why so many projects fail, i.e., do not comply with predefined
budgets, time constraints, or product scope and quality. Overconfidence leads project
managers through the mediator of risk awareness, to assess estimated risk occurrence
probability and estimated risk impact more optimistically. Themediation through risk
awareness indicates that overconfidence may be linked to the reduced availability of
risks, which leads to risks being perceived as non-threatening and unlikely to occur.
Such biased risk assessmentmay lead companies to start seemingly beneficial projects
which later show an unfavorable benefit–cost ratio, indicating that they should have
never been undertaken in the first place.
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See Figs. 3 and 4.
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